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Introduction 
Much has been written about the global financial crisis 
(GFC), with the press raising many questions, such as: 
Did boards fail in their fiduciary duty to their 
shareholders? 
Was creative accounting or fraud involved? 
Did directors understand their company's 
business models and the associated risks? 
Did the regulators fail? 
Were the credit agencies at fault? 
Did. incehtive-based-cultures at financial 
institutions encourage greed and _ 
excessive risk taking? _ .. 
Were the problems generated by the rise of 
increasingly complex financial instruments? 
Was there widespread ethical failure? (Tricker 
2009; Oakes 2009; Saatchi 2009). 
In contrast to earlier corporate crises, such as the 
collapse of En ron, WorldCom and Barings, it has 
been observed by Woods et al. (2009) that the role 
, of auditors during the GFC appears to have received 
relatively limited media coverage and, in fact, it has 
been the banking institutions and the regulators that 
appear to be getting most of the blame. Nevertheless, 
a crucial question remains that has only recently 
been gaining exposure. Where were the auditors, 
the guardians and gatekeepers, the professionals we 
should be able to trust? 
The objective of this paper is to consider the GFC 
crisis from the perspective of the role of the auditing 
profession. While it is still too early to determine whether 
there will be many legal actions resulting from audit 
failures during the GFC, it is nevertheless timely to 
consider at the start whether audit failures in the past 
are a predictor of the criticism, and possible legal action, 
auditors may face as a result of the current crisis. This 
paper then considers the challenges facing auditors, the 
audit expectation gap, the potential professional fallout 
for auditors from the GFC, and then concludes on the 
question of whether auditors can be trusted. 
A history lesson 
If one were to identify the seminal event that changed 
the world of auditing, it would be the implosion of 
the then highly respected global accounting firm, 
Arthur Andersen in 2002. A famous quote from a 
book written by Barbara Toffler about the downfall of 
Arthur Andersen {Toffler 2003) crystallises the issue. 
Toffler, who had worked at Arthur Andersen and 
seen its ethical culture decay in the pursuit of higher 
profits, noted a comment from Steve Samek, Country 
Managing Partner, Arthur Andersen US, on the firm's 
Independence and Ethical Standards CD- ROM, which 
was issued to staff in 1999. In an introduction to the CD, 
·Samek observed that the day Arthur Andersen lost the 
public trust would be the day that it would go out of 
business (Toffler 2003). 
Arthur Andersen, the prestigious global accounting 
firm, established in 1913, with 85,000 employees 
worldwide, went out of business in 2002. It was the 
first international accounting firm convicted on 
criminal charges because of its involvement in Enron, 
a conviction that was ironically overturned on appeal 
in 2005, but by then it was too late. Although Arthur 
Andersen was certainly not the largest of the then 
Big 5 firms in terms of its auditing practice, it had 
experienced a disproportionate number of audit 
failures. These included a series of major audit failures 
at Waste Management. Sunbeam, Arizona Baptist 
Foundation, Global Crossing, WorldCom and Enron 
in the US, and Bond Corporation and HIH Insurance 
in Australia. Furthermore, these failures were not 
technical failures. For example, the creative accounting 
accepted by Arthur Andersen at WorldCom is what 
students would study in Accounting 101; at Enron, 
with its special purpose entities, it was Accounting 102. 
Arguably, the failure on the Arthur Andersen audits 
was of an ethical rather than a technical nature. 
As Leung and Cooper (2003) noted at the time, the 
opportunistic behaviour of managers and directors 
and the lack of transparency in large corporations, was 
compounded by the failure of the corporate watchdogs, 
such as auditors and regulators, to protect the public 
interest. The resultant subsequent tightening of the 
international auditing standards, and developments such 
as a new code of professional ethics for accountants, the 
passing of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the United States in 
2002 and the CLERP 9 Act in Australia in 2004 are all now 
history, but have things changed? As th-e GFC plays out 
to its conclusion, a crucial question remains that has not 
yet had much exposure. Where were the auditors? As 
observed by Tricker (2009): 
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... unqualified audit reports up to the collapse (GFC) 
had concluded that the directors' reports and accounts 
reasonably reflected reality. Yet, as is now known, the 
strateitc model underlying the securitisation of mortgage 
debt and the expectation that financial markets would 
always be liquid was highly suspect and could expose 
businesses to massive risk, even the possibility of trading 
when insolvent and ultimately failing. 
The changing challenges. 
facing auditors 
An underlying feature of the GFC is that it developed 
during a period of rapid financialisation of Western 
economies, particularly in the United States. As 
observed by Sikka (2009), this financialisation process 
created an abundance of credit and encouraged 
excessive risk-taking through complex financial 
instruments (derivatives, credit default swaps, etc.), 
and corporate structures and ineffective regulatory 
mechanisms must also share some blame. The fall 
out in the banking sector from this period of excess 
has been dramatic. The UK government nationalised 
Northern Rock and forced takeovers of banks in trouble, 
such as the Royal Bank of Scotland. The US government 
closed dozens of banks including well known 
institutions such as Lehman Brothers and Washington 
Mutual and provided billions of dollars to rescue major 
financial institutions such as Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae 
and Bear Stearn. In Australia, the relatively strong 
banking sector received government guarantees. 
The GFC has raised a key question relating to the 
basic auditing model and total auditor income. As 
Sikka (2009) observes, the auditing firms are capitalist 
enterprises and are dependent upon companies and . 
their directors for income: 
The fee dependency impairs claims of independence and 
has the capacity to silence auditors. It poses fundamental 
questions about the private sector model of auditing, 
which expects one set of capitalist entrepreneurs (auditors) 
to regulate another set of capitalist entrepreneurs 
(company directors) (Sikka 2009, p. 5). 
Tricker (2009) supports this view and observes that 
by the beginning of the 21st century, the five major 
accounting firms had become ' ... vast, international 
and concentrated ... they were major businesses, 
offering products and solutions ... [and] that auditing 
has ceased to be a professi~n: it has become a business'. 
There is also the question of whether auditors 
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now have the expertise to audit complex financial 
institutions. The earlier times of auditing in an industriz 
era represented by easily measurable tangible physical 
assets such as inventory and manufacturing plant 
has been eclipsed by complex financial instruments; 
for example, derivatives, whose value depends on 
uncertain future events and can be anything from 
zero to hundreds of millions of dollars. As noted by 
Sikka (2009), derivatives were central to the collapse of 
financial and non-financial businesses, such as Barings, 
En ron and Parma lat. Also in the UK, where the Royal 
Bank of Scotland has effectively been nationalised 
by the government, and investors are beginning to 
question whether the auditors, Deloitte, should have 
spotted problems some time ago. Similar questions 
are being asked of both KPMG, which audited HBOS, 
and o.f PricewaterhouseCoopers, which audited Lloyds 
TSB-the other two big banks now receiving state 
support (Dev and Rushe 2009). 
The audit expectation gap 
The audit expectation gap is arguablyone of the major 
issues that has been confronting the auditing profession 
for several years. As observed by Leung et al. (2009, p. 102 
... financiaf statement users such as invest9rs, expect 
auditors to provide assurance concerning materia{ 
fraud, irregufarities and the viability of the business and 
its management. When entities foil through fraud or 
mismanagement, there is a tendency to blame the audita 
for not having given adequate warning of the problems. 
Attempts to reduce the expectation gap through 
changes to the wording of the auditor's report, 
including the suggestion-of a plain English version, 
appea·r to remain unfilled (Leung et al. 2009). 
There is n6 aoubt that auditors remain nervous about 
the expectation gap-and its interpretation by others 
outside the profession. Spence (2009) reported in the 
UK on a meeting of the Big 4 accounting firms with th, 
government to plead for protection as they prepared 
for a surge in litigation from investors trying to recover 
their losses from big company failures. There were 
fears that a blockbuster lawsuit, if successful, could 
put one or more of them out of business and the Big 
4 argued that this could trigger the collapse of the 
audit market and cause chaos for business. The ghost 
of Arthur Andersen still hangs heavy over the auditing 
profession. As Shields (2009) points out 
... commentators are still bound to ask some big 
questions. Should auditors have predicted the liquidity 
and 'going concern' issues, which resulted in the recent 
Government bail-outs? Should auditors have foreseen 
the 'big freeze' in the wholesale funding markets? 
But then again as Shields (2009) further argues, ' . . . it 
wou ld have been remarkable if they had done: most 
bank directors didn't see it coming and the same goes 
for rating agencies, regulators, economists, centra l 
banks and governments'. 
The potential professional fallout 
from the current financial crisis-
are auditors in trouble? 
Regardless of the expectation gap, several questions 
need to be asked. Is it possible we may have another 
implosion of an international accounting firm? Are we 
going to see an even more draconian Sarbanes Oxley 
version 27 Are auditors going to become scapegoats? 
So far, it appears that criticism and blame has focused 
primarily on individual banking institutions qnd the 
strength of their management and business-models, 
remuneration structures and incentive-based cultures 
(Oakes 2009; Saatchi 2009; T oynbee 2009). The financial 
regulators and credit rating agencies have also found 
themselves subject to serious questioning, but auditors 
have largely escaped critical comment and the 
apportionment of blame. Indeed, the profession has 
been able to respond to criticism in some jurisdictions, 
by relying on official assurances by independent 
oversight bodies as to the general quality of audit work 
(Humphrey et al. 2009). However, concerns remain and 
there are some ominous signs. In a recent article, Hughes 
(2009) refers to pictures being beamed around the world 
of the two PricewaterhouseCoopers partners arrested as 
part of the police investigations into the alleged massive 
fraud at Satyam in India. In the same week in London: 
. .. auditors were grilled by members of parliament 
about their role in the·banking crisis, while in Miami, 
lawyers are gearing up for a landmark case against 
BOO, the fifth-biggest accounting firm ... just the latest 
in a sequence of events which have begged the age-old 
question of 'where were the auditors?' 
An earlier example is that in 2006, three auditors 
from the Japanese firm of ChuoAoyama 
PricewaterhouseCoopers were given a suspended 
prison sentence for their role in an accounting fraud 
at Kanebo Limited, a major cosmetics and textiles 
company (Sikka et al. 2009) . . 
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So, can auditors be trusted? 
There is no doubt that since the seminal event of the 
implosion of Arthur Andersen in 2002! much has been 
done by the auditing profession and international 
standard setters to improve the quality of audits. There has 
also been a substantial upgrading of regulatory regimes, 
particularly in the US, UK and Australia. However, on a less 
positive note, the audit expectation gap, continues to 
exist. As Houghton et al. (2009, p. xv) observe: 
... it is not possible that this gap can be 'closed: This is so for 
a number of reasons, including the perceived complexity 
of financial reports, which is a function of accounting 
standards and for which auditors cannot be held 
responsible. The wide disparity between retail and more 
sophisticated investors in terms of their understanding of 
financial and related reports is another reason for our view 
that the audit expectations gap is not closable. 
It is important to appreciate that an auditor gives an 
opinion on a set of financial statements at balance 
date, and that many of the events that led to the 
collapse of companies such as Lehman Brothers and 
the Royal Bank of Scotland happened very quickly 
between reporting periods. As pointed out by Woods 
et al. (2009, p. 118), it needs to be appreciated that: 
... a key problem for auditors is the verification of 
the valuation of illiquid assets, bearing in mind the 
consequential impact that such valuations can 
have on the reported profits (or losses) of major 
banking institutions ... in volatile markets, significant 
adjustments to opinions on valuation may be required 
within a very short time frame, and for companies highly 
exposed to collateralised debt markets, valuing these 
elements of their balance sheets is not straightforward. 
The media in the last year or so has reported several 
valuation disputes between auditors and their clients. 
Smith (2008) has reported on the case of Bradford 
& Bingley, a large bank in the UK that became a 
victim of the GFC, and its write-down of its synthetic 
CDOs (collateralised debt obligations) in closing its 
accounts for 2007. The auditor, KPMG, found itself in 
tough talks with management over the valuation of 
financial instruments-the critical nature of which 
was reinforced by subsequent events that led to the 
nationalisation of the mortgage arm of Bradford & 
Bingley by the UK government in September 2008. 
Goldstein and Henry (2007) provide another example 
of where auditors challenged the approach to 
accounting for assets within financial institutions, in 
relation to the valuations of certain assets held by two 
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hedge funds managed by failed investment bank, 
Bear Stearns. Confidential documents the authors 
uncovered revealed that Deloitte & Touche, the funds' 
auditor, warned that the majority of the funds' net 
assets had been estimated by its own managers, in the 
absence of readily ascertainable market values. These 
are examples of where auditors found themselves_in 
difficult positions in maintaining their independence 
and meeting their statutory obligations during the GFC. 
At the time of writing, there have been relatively few 
negative observations about auditors and their role in 
the GFC. Houghton et al. (2009) have noted that while 
criticisms of bankers, regulators, directors and senior 
executives, advisory firms, hedge funds and other 
financial service organisations continue to rise, little 
concern has been expressed about the role of auditing. 
Houghton et al. (2009) also observed that in some ways 
the GFC can be seen as a stress test of audit, where the 
stress has not resulted in structural failure. 
There is no doubt that the auditing profession has 
learnt from the seminal event of the implosion in 
2002 of Arthur Andersen. In Australia, the Financial 
Reporting Council is now a major force for the 
monitoring of the accounting and auditing profession, 
with control of both the Australian Accounting 
Standards Board and the Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board, both of which were formerly 
controlled by the profession. The profession has also 
tried hard to salvage its credibility by actions, such as, 
adopting the International Federation of Accountants' 
Code of ethics for professional accountants and also 
introducing into the Code some more stringent 
ethical requirements. The Accounting and Auditing 
Standards have been made much more prescriptive 
and now have the force of law. The ethical standards 
contain_~d- in the professional bodies' Code of ethics 
are referenced in the legally enforceable Australian 
Auditing Standards, and in this context also now have 
the force oflaw. But isit:really possible to legislate trust 
and ethics? Will the GFC result in even more stringent 
regulation of the accounting profession? 
At present, the profession has come through relatively 
unscathed by the GFC, but it is probably too early to 
determine what extra legislation or regulatory changes 
may evolve as a result of the GFC, and how such 
developments will influence the auditing profession. in 
fact, it could be argued that the initiatives taken by the 
auditing profession after the corporate collapses and 
demise of Arthur Andersen several years ago, provided 
the profession with the strength it needed to cope with 
the excesses leading up to the GFC. Regardless, what is 
needed going forward is uncompromising independence 
and ethical behaviour by auditors and reinforcement of 
the public trust, and the directions to date are arguably 
positive. So, in the eyes of the regulators, government and 
the investing public, can auditors be trusted?Time will tell 
... trust me-I'm an auditor ... 
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